In early 1943 RAF Flight Lieutenant D A ‘Tommy’ Grant was a test pilot at the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough, where he was one of a small number of expert pilots dedicated to exploring and developing the techniques and technology of the new art of glider warfare. When he heard that a glider operation was in the offing in North Africa, he arranged to have himself posted on an operational attachment to 295 Squadron. The Squadron comprised the Halifaxes that were due to tow Horsas during the invasion of Sicily. What follows is an edited transcript of Grant’s after-action report on Operation Fustian, the glider assault south of Catania to seize the Primosole Bridge. Text in square brackets is editorial.
For Grant’s report on Operation Beggar, see [here]. For his report on Operation Ladbroke, see [here].
Operation “Fustian”
The second operation which was planned to take place on ’D’ day, the 10th July [Operation Glutton, to take a bridge near Augusta], never came off. On the 10th it was postponed because the Eighth Army had not advanced far enough. On the 11th it was cancelled because the Eighth Army had taken the position already. This shows how difficult it is to plan airborne operations in conjunction with advancing troops. However, the third operation having been postponed on the 12th took place on the night of the 13/14th. The plan of the operation was as follows.
One Brigade of parachutists was to be dropped on dropping zones near the [Primosole] bridge over a river South of Catania at between 20.00 hours and 21.00 hours. Albemarles and C.47s were to do the dropping. Our remaining 11 Horsas were to land at 01.00 hours. Seven Horsas were to be towed by Halifaxes and four by Albemarles.
Two flare paths were to be laid out by the parachutists for the gliders, one with an orange light and one with a green light. The height of release was 500 feet on the leeward boundary of the landing zone, flying in the direction of landing.
The load of the Horsas was one six-pounder gun and a jeep, with a crew of six. I watched about 25 men putting the gun into the glider [Horsa 126]; it took them about half an hour. I asked the glider crew of six how they were going to get the gun out quickly. They were not very hopeful. An explosive for blowing off the nose or the tail of the glider had been developed, but for some reason they were not taking it on the operation. All they had were axes.
The Navy had put a 10 mile danger area all the way round the South East coast of Sicily. As the visibility for that night was given as five miles, in order to make a land fall before we reached the objective, we would have to go inside the danger area.
The undercarriages of the Horsas towed by Halifaxes were wired on, so that they could not be released. In the case of the Albemarles there was some discussion. The undercarriages were left jettisonable, and the glider pilots were told to jettison them if the Albemarles were in difficulty.
We took off at 10.15 hours. This time we were allowed to fly at our own airspeed and had ample time to get to our objective by zero hour. The take off was not very pleasant, as we took off in rapid succession at night, and the aerodrome was very dusty. We had to shine an Aldis lamp from the rear turret to enable gliders to follow the tugs through the dust. One rope was broken on take off. The end of the rope went through the nose of the Horsa and made it unserviceable, so only 10 Horsas went on the operation.
I flew to Malta at 1,100 feet instead of 500 feet. This was just as well, as a few miles out to sea we went straight over a convoy flying balloons at 1,000 feet. Two other Halifaxes went over this convoy. Off Sicily we went inside the danger area to make our land fall. Just as we did this the whole inter-com. system of the aircraft packed up. While the wireless operator was mending it, we made our land fall at Port Augusta. We were shot at by the Navy or by the shore defences. There was one convoy outside the danger area, 10 miles off Syracuse, which seemed to be shooting at everything. We had been told not to signal the colours of the day, so we could do nothing but hope. One pilot was so frightened by the Navy that he made his land fall in Catania harbour. He found that the Italians were equally unfriendly.
We arrived in the Bay south of Catania with several minutes to spare, so we circled out to sea. We decided to pin-point the mouth of the river before doing a run over the landing zone. We saw a large number of fires to the North. This we took to be Catania, which was being bombed by the Wellingtons. We crossed the coast half way between these fires and Port Augusta at 500 feet, and found ourselves a mile or two to the South of our target. I thought of turning to the North, but decided that it would be easier for the glider pilot to approach the target from the direction we had arranged, and so we went back across the coast to make another run in. We flew up the coast until we found the river, and turned in-land towards the landing zone. To our surprise, we were flying straight towards the fires we had taken to be Catania. We gave our glider pilot the positions on the map as we flew along, ending with the point of release. However, he said that he could not see where he was to land. As releases at 500 feet in the direction of landing must be instantaneous, I had either to pull him off myself, or to go round again. I decided to go round again. During the run in we flew into fairly intensive machine gun-fire from the ground below us. Also, we came under the attention of some search-lights and A.A. guns from the direction of Catania. From the noise and the smell in the cockpit we guessed that we had been hit. (On our return an armour-piercing bullet was picked out of the floor board under the second pilot’s seat. There was also some damage to the starboard fin and rudder, which was charitably attributed by the ground crew to enemy action. I thought that it was caused by stones on the aerodrome). With a glider on the back it is impossible to do much in the way of evasive action. We did a fairly steep turn to the left. This was the only time in Africa that I did anything above a rate half turn without the glider pilot complaining that he could not follow me. We went in again, and this time the glider released at the point of release immediately we told him. I did not meet him again, as I left for England before he returned to Africa, but I heard on secondhand authority that he got down all right. He was caught in machine gunfire on the way down and had to dive. However, he landed just the other side of the bridge in the landing zone.
This was an extremely difficult release for the glider pilot. I do not know if there was a flare path, but it was certainly impossible to see one. The tremendous number of fires was very distracting. In one place, it looked as though a whole field was on fire. Apart from the fires there was a pall of smoke drifting over the whole landing area. From out to sea this looked like an inland lake
On the way home I felt extremely unhappy about dropping the glider in this place, and blamed myself for not finding a less disturbed position about a mile or so away, where he could land and get his gun and jeep out in his own time. This would have been comparatively easy, as the night was very clear.
However, I have been told that the flying part of this operation was more successful than “Ladbrook”. A considerable number of the gliders did get down in the right place, and five guns were unloaded – and brought into action. The fires that we saw were caused by a battle which was going on between the Parachute Brigade and the Hermann Goering Regiment of German parachutists [in fact the German 1st Parachute Division], who had been dropped a few hours before our troops, just South of our landing zones. A number of the English parachutists were brought back that night by their pilots, who had not flown over the landing zones. The figure given me by a Staff Officer – was as high as 600 troops brought back. A number were also shot down at sea on their way to Sicily. In consequence, our airborne troops on the ground were out-numbered by the Germans. Although they captured the bridge they were forced to retreat, and the bridge was abandoned. However, they removed the mines from under the bridge, and when the Eighth Army came up and the bridge was again captured, the Germans had not been able to destroy it.
As far as the landing of gliders was concerned, the parachutists turned out to be a disadvantage. The night was so light that it would have been quite easy to land a glider without a flare path. The fires and smoke of the battle between the parachutists made it extremely difficult.
From this operation a number of aircraft were missing. From our part of the operation one Halifax and two Albemarles did not return.
Conclusions
Low Releases
The second operation [Fustian] was a low release with ground aids. As I have said before, these ground aids were of no assistance to the gliders. Rebecca Mk. 2 in the tug might be useful to help the tug tow the glider to the point of release on a dark night, but it will not assist the glider to land in darkness, unless the glider has a Rebecca Mk. 3 and there is another beacon for it on the landing zone.
[Grant’s other conclusions appear in his report on Operation Ladbroke.]
Experimental work
The experimental side of glider flying is even more important than it is in the case of other kinds of flying. The average glider pilot, as has been shown, is very inexperienced. Therefore, experimental establishments are about the only places where gliders are flown by pilots of any experience.
In this operation the experimental establishments had not done all the necessary experimental work. This was largely because they had not been asked to do it. The Aero/Airborne Department and Flight at the R.A.E. [Royal Aircraft Establishment] had made great efforts to establish liaison with the operational Squadrons, but, as has been shown, the operational Squadrons were also caught unprepared. It is difficult to know with whom we should have been in liaison. Clearly, it must be at the highest level. I suggest that there should be a direct liaison between the experimental establishments and the Headquarters of the Airborne Division. The other side of the liaison which consists of seeing how anything developed at the R.A.E. is working in practice, is quite easy to organise. It requires constant visits to the Squadrons.
Two new experimental establishments are forming. One is called, I believe, Airborne Forces Development Unit. The other is the Tactical Development Unit, and is not yet formed. There is plenty of work for these Units, but there has been for some time a lack of cohesion in experimental work on the airborne side. It is not clear how the formation of two new Units will assist this.
I have summarized below a few points which I think might be considered by the experimental establishments:-
(i) Night towing without flame dampers and with flame dampers, with various makes of tugs.
(ii) Night landings, both remote release and low releases:-
(a) By moon-light without ground aids.
(b) Using “Rebecca” [radar homing beacon].
(c) Using the minimum number of lights on the ground.
(d) Using flares dropped by aircraft.
(iii) Fitting a map reading panel in the Horsa.
(iv) Methods of quick unloading of jeeps and six-pounders and other heavy equipment from the Horsa.
(v) Development of new undercarriage on Horsas with reduced drag.
(vi) Development of flaps or air brakes on Hadrians, for instance, a tail parachute.
(vii) Investigation of the story that a Hadrian cannot be flown on tow above 125 m.p.h. I.A.S. [Indicated Air Speed].
(viii) in order to assist anyone planning a remote release in future, an exact figure of the rate of sink of the gliders at various loads and air speeds should be ascertained. (in the operation the Horsa at 8,000 lb. load and 90 m.p.h. seemed to lose height at 800 feet a minute). Also, a table should be prepared showing the airspeeds at which various gliders should be flown with different loads and in varying wind speeds and directions, and the distance the gliders can be released from their target with different loads and under varying wind conditions.
(ix) Jettisoning of auxiliary tanks on the towing Halifaxes and the fitting of hand pumps as auxiliary to the immersion pumps in these tanks.
A version of this article appeared in “Glider Pilot’s Notes”, the magazine of the Glider Pilot Regiment Society.
