In early 1943 RAF Flight Lieutenant D A ‘Tommy’ Grant was a test pilot at the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough, where he was one of a small number of expert pilots dedicated to exploring and developing the techniques and technology of the new art of glider warfare. When he heard that a glider operation was in the offing in North Africa, he arranged to have himself posted on an operational attachment to 295 Squadron. The Squadron comprised the Halifaxes that were due to tow Horsas during the invasion of Sicily. What follows is an edited transcript of Grant’s after-action report on Operation Ladbroke, the opening glider assault of the invasion. Text in square brackets is editorial.
For Grant’s report on Operation Beggar, see [here], and for his report on Operation Fustian, see [here].
On the 5th July I arrived at Kairouan [in Tunisia]. The 6th was the hottest day of the year, being 125° in the shade. At nine o’clock that evening the captains and navigators of the Halifaxes were taken to another aerodrome, where No. 296 Squadron were stationed, and told the main outline of the operation. It was as follows.
The invasion of Sicily was timed for six o’clock on the morning of the 10th July, called ‘D’ day. On the night of ‘D’ minus 1 airborne troops were to be landed. The main force was to consist of 125 Waco Hadrian gliders towed by C.47s of the 51st U.S. Army Transport Wing and Albemarles of No. 296 Squadron. This force was to deal with the coastal defences. The Halifaxes were to land Horsa gliders further inland, to hold a bridge and prevent reinforcements coming up to the coast. Two other glider operations were also planned, one on ‘D’ day to take an objective West of Syracuse [in fact Augusta], another on ‘D’ plus 1 to take a bridge South of Catania. We were given no details about the operations, and were told to keep the dates secret, even from our crews. This, of course, was the first time the dates had been mentioned to us. On the 7th, Colonel Chatterton of the Glider Pilot Regiment came and spoke to us about the operation generally.
Between the 6th and 9th we were very busy polishing our aircraft up for the operation. We were suffering from the effects of arriving so late at our forward base. Up to the 9th we had only one small bowser, holding 600 gallons, to fill 7 Halifaxes. As well as preparing aircraft, the aircrew were put on to digging slit trenches, guarding the aircraft, manhandling 50 gallon barrels of petrol, and erecting tents. This went on right up to the day of the operation.
Operation “Ladbrook”
This was the main operation on the 9th. We were briefed at 13.00 hours. We had no Operations Room on our aerodrome, and therefore had to go to No.296 Squadron for our briefing. This was disadvantageous, as it meant that we could not study the photographs and large scale maps of the area at our leisure. We were briefed separately from No.296 Squadron, and were not told much about the main force. Our own force consisted of 8 Horsas towed by our 7 Halifaxes and one Albemarle, piloted by Wing Commander May of No. 296 Squadron. Each Horsa was to carry 30 men of the South Staffordshire Regiment, with one Bren gun, a mortar and 20 bombs, and some Bangalore torpedoes (used for blowing up barbed wire). The total load was, I believe, 8,000 lb. The timing of the operation was done in an unusual way, which did not prove effective. The time of our take-off was laid down and we were told to keep to it as strictly as possible. We were given no set time to release, but were told to fly at certain air speed. The assumption was that in this way we would all release our gliders at the same time. The Halifaxes were told to fly level at 140 m.p.h. and climb at 130 m.p.h. Unfortunately, because of the condition of our aircraft, none of us could manage these speeds. Wing Commander May in the Albemarle took off earlier than us and flew as arranged at 120 m.p.h. As we could not keep to our air speed we released our gliders 15 minutes after him.
We were briefed to fly to Malta at 500 feet. From there we were to climb to 3,500 feet (later changed to 4,000 feet). We were to fly along the South East coast of Sicily until we came to a bay South of Syracuse. At a point in the Bay, 3,000 yards from the shore, we were to release the gliders. The gliders were then to glide 7 miles towards their landing zone, which was a bridge over a canal South West of Syracuse. We were given a night map of the area.
My glider pilots were Staff Sergeant Galpin and Sergeant Brown, who also had night maps of the area. I marked on both maps points along the coast A, B, C, D. Point D was the point of release. We also arranged a course for them to steer from that point to their landing zones. We were to keep in touch with the glider on line inter-com, all the time. If that failed we were going to flash an Aldis lamp when we came to the point of release. Only if that failed were we going to use the T.R.9, and we evolved a little code of our own for release.
There was considerable discussion about the undercarriage of the Horsas. The tug pilots wanted the Horsas to jettison their undercarriages, as it made their tow easier. The glider pilots felt that it made their job much more difficult, as they could not steer the glider on the ground after landing. Those Horsas all had differential brakes. I was in favour of the glider pilots, I felt that their job was so difficult already that nothing should be done to make it even worse. In the end the undercarriages of the Horsas towed by the Halifaxes were not jettisoned. They were, in fact, wired up, so that they could not be jettisoned. This was probably unwise, as in the event of engine trouble on the Halifax, the pilot might not be able to keep the Horsa airborne, whereas if the undercarriage could be jettisoned, he would be able to carry on with the flight. The undercarriage of the Horsa towed by the Albemarle was jettisoned, as Wing Commander May said that he would not have enough fuel to return to base if the undercarriage was kept on. We took off at 20.05 hours. On take-off our starboard inner boost regulator failed. We could only get +4 lb. boost on this engine, and soon it dropped to +1/2 lb. As I could not maintain height I had to turn back to the aerodrome. Luckily when we were over the aerodrome it righted itself, and the boost went up to +9 lb. This circuit made us a little late. As we were still uncertain of our starboard inner, we decided to fly to Malta at 2,000 feet instead of 500 feet.
On the way to Malta my starboard outer radiator temperature gauge went unserviceable, so did the D.R. compass and the automatic pilot, on which I was relying to cover up my instrument flying. In spite of my instrument flying, my navigator managed to take several drifts on the way to Malta and after we had turned towards Sicily. He calculated that there would be a wind of 30 m.p.h. against the glider pilot after releasing. We decided to climb to 5,000 feet instead of 4,000 feet and to release the glider over land two miles nearer the target. As we were running along the coast of Sicily my navigator told me the wind was dropping considerably. We then decided to keep to our height of 5,000 feet and to release him in the pre-arranged position. We had a little flak from the coast – only two guns as far as I could see. I could see the coast and the harbour of Syracuse very clearly below, although it was not a clear night. The moon was still in the first quarter. It was low in the sky and behind us. As we ran along the coast we gave the glider pilot the points on the map as we passed them, and eventually ‘D’, the point to release. He released instantly. We flew back to base; nothing interesting happened on the way back, except that the boost regulator went unserviceable again. We were kept circling over the aerodrome for 45 minutes, and when we landed the moon was completely down and most of the flares had either been knocked out or had burnt out.
I met my glider pilot on his return to Africa, and he told me his story. Evidently he was not able to see the coast when he released. However, he turned to the pre-arranged course and flew on that course without map reading for 1,500 feet. His air-speed was 90 to 95 m.p.h. At 3,000 feet he managed to pick up the Bay of Syracuse and flew along it. At 1,500 feet he saw the canal ahead and then he knew where the landing zone was. At 1,000 feet, as he was doing his circuit, he was caught in light machine gun-fire. He made a dive approach, that is he came in low and fast at about 125 m.p.h. He landed in the correct field quite intact, only breaking the nose wheel in a ditch at the end of his run. His 30 passengers disembarked and took the bridge without much opposition. They held it throughout the night.
Two incidents during the night are worth recording. First, they removed all the mines from underneath the bridge, and sat back satisfied that whatever happened the bridge would remain intact for the Eighth Army to cross. Immediately afterwards a Wellington, which was meant to be bombing Syracuse, dropped a stick of bombs right across the bridge. Luckily, it missed the bridge. The second incident was when an Italian soldier, who was evidently a member of the picquet guarding the bridge, came and handed in his sleeping out pass.
In the morning they were reinforced by some troops from the other Horsas and some from the Hadrians which had landed near the coast. In all, there were about 70 troops on the bridge, but they still only had one Bren gun, 20 mortar bombs and their small arms. Throughout the day they were attacked by the Italians. They ran out of ammunition, and at 3.30 in the afternoon the Colonel of the South Staffordshire Regiment decided to surrender. They were taken prisoner and marched back towards the coast. After they had gone a mile or so they came across the Eighth Army in the guise of an officer on a bicycle, followed by a Bren gun carrier. The tables were then turned on the Italians.
If the airborne troops could have held the bridge for another hour, it is almost certain that they would have been relieved by the Eighth Army, but still, considering their numbers and their arms, it was amazing that they held it so long. They stopped the traffic over the bridge while they held it, and prevented it being blown up, so that the Eighth Army were able to cross the canal without any difficulty. This was the only Horsa out of the eight to land successfully at the landing zone. Of the others, two were still missing when I left Africa. A third was prematurely released, the rope breaking five miles out to sea. The glider was discovered in the sea near the beach, but the pilot and crew were missing. A fourth Horsa crashed into the bank of the canal. All the crew were killed. It is thought that it may have been set on fire in the air by machine gun bullets hitting the Bangalore torpedoes. The other three Horsas landed in various places about two miles short of the landing zone. These crashed on landing, as the fields in Sicily are very small and have stone walls. However, most of the troops seem to have got out unhurt. From this operation all the tugs returned safely.
The reason for the high rate of casualties on the flying side was lack of training. The glider pilots had only done 1 ½ – 3 hours night flying on Horsas. They had not done any night flying for some eight months, and had never done a landing by night without a flare path, nor a remote release at night before. The conditions for map reading on that night were bad, as the moon was low and there was some mist. The wind, although it was dying down, was still considerable. It was probably not taken into account by the tugs when releasing, as the tug pilots were equally untrained. They had never done a similar exercise before, and most of them had never done any night towing. In spite of this, one pilot put up a very good effort; one engine failed on the climb to Malta, but he managed to tow his glider over Sicily on three. I was doing my first four-engined night flight, and it was also the first time that I had ever taken an aircraft off the circuit of an aerodrome at night. In short, there were too many people doing something for the first time that night.
I think that possibly it would have been a good idea if the glider pilots had been given an alternative landing zone a mile or two short of their objective which they could use if they found they were undershooting.
The Main Operation – Waco Hadrian Towed by C.47s and Albemarles
Colonel Chatterton of the Glider Pilot Regiment and two Squadrons of 240 glider pilots had arrived in North Africa two months before the operation. Colonel Chatterton was then told that he was to land his gliders by the light of the moon without the loss of a tug, as the tugs were required for future operations. All the gliders were to land within half an hour, and if possible within 20 minutes. Hence, it was decided to release the gliders off the coast of Sicily, and landing zones were chosen for the gliders a mile inside the coast.
Planning the operation was only one of Colonel Chatterton’s problems. He had to convert his 240 glider pilots to Hadrians, and the Hadrians in question were not yet assembled. The glider pilots themselves assembled 52 Hadrians in 10 days, although they had never seen one before. A training programme was then put into operation, and the 51st Transport Wing of the American Air Force co-operated very well. The glider pilots provided all their own handling parties. In 25 days they completed 1,900 flights. This was an average of about 8 per glider pilot, and included a night flight and three trial exercises, on the basis of which the height of release and the distance from the objective on the night of the operation were based. Towards the end of this training programme No. 296 (Albemarle) Squadron of the R.A.F. arrived and took part in the exercises.
The Hadrian was found to have four disadvantages. It had spoilers instead of flaps, and the pilots found difficulty in losing height and speed. Secondly, its safety limitation on tow was thought by the glider pilots to be 125 mph I.A.S.; this would make it unsuitable for towing by the Albemarle. Thirdly, it could take a jeep or a six-pounder gun, but not both. Unless two Hadrians landed together, the troops had either an unarmed jeep or an immobilized gun. It was also found that if a Hadrian carrying a six-pounder gun made a heavy landing, the gun went through the bottom of the aircraft into the ground.
On the night of the 9th about 125 Hadrians were towed to Sicily, about 25 by No.296 Squadron and the rest by 51 Transport Wing. Their point of release was 3,000 yards off the shore, and their height was 1,500 feet. As in the case of the Horsas, a very small percentage actually reached their landing zone. On one landing zone I was told that there were only eight Hadrians out of a proposed 50. Of the rest a number landed on the coast in various places, and the remainder were in the sea. I do not know the official figures, but I have since been told unofficially that 57 gliders were in the sea up to a distance of 6 miles from the coast. In most cases this must have been due to an error of judgment on the part of the tug. As I have said before, there was still a fairly strong wind, and no doubt this fact was neglected by the tug pilots. Also, it is difficult to judge accurately a distance of 3,000 yards from any object, and possibly some tug pilots misjudged this distance. The C.47 is unsuitable for glider towing on operations, as it has no armament or armour. It may be that some tug pilots’ judgment was affected by apprehension on this score.
Some glider pilots to whom I talked had ditched several miles from the coast, and some had stories that they had been released by the tug pilots immediately a little flak appeared on the horizon. If this was true, it would seem to be inexcusable. There is no doubt that the responsibility for putting the gliders in the sea must rest with the tug pilot. He should ascertain the wind strength before releasing. The glider pilot has no method of taking drifts.
All the towing aircraft returned to base.
In this operation the aim of getting the gliders down within 20 minutes was put before a safety margin in height. In the case of the Horsas, any extra height can easily be lost. With the Hadrians it is not quite so easy. However, it is obviously best, in the light of what happened, to have extra height. It may well be useful to the glider for doing evasive action.
In spite of the casualties in the air, this operation was a complete success on the ground. When the sea-borne troops arrived there were no coastal defences left [not in fact corredt]. General Montgomery stated that the airborne troops advanced the invasion of Sicily by seven days. It would be interesting to know how many casualties he estimates he would have suffered in those seven days.
Conclusions
Night towing
In spite of lack of practice, the glider pilots found very little difficulty in following the Halifaxes if all the lights were turned out, simply flying from the exhaust from the engines. This should be sufficient, as the darker the night the more the exhaust will show up. However, in case flame damping should be improved, experiments should be carried out to ascertain the minimum of lights which are required on the tug. Two resin lights on the wing tips should be enough.
Night landing of gliders
Remote releases. This was tried in indifferent visibility, and without any aids from the ground. Its failure was caused, in my opinion, by a miscalculation about the point of release, considering the amount of wind, and by the lack of experience of the glider pilots and the tug pilots. The fact that one glider accomplished it without any training, showed that it was possible.
If a remote release can be done without any aids from the ground, it would obviously be more effective. Aids on the ground are likely to destroy the element of surprise. In this respect, the use of Rebecca would be better than lights, although Rebecca may not be an assistance to the actual touch down, and seems to be fallible under operational conditions. The only time that it was used in Sicily was in an independent parachute operation [by the SAS], and then it was not successful. I think also that experiments should be carried out using flares dropped by the tug aircraft or by other aircraft.
Where there is sufficient moon there should be no artificial landing aids. The ideal must be to train the glider pilots to land in as little light as possible in order to fool the efences. This needs great practice.
Low releases
If lights are to be laid out, they should only be lit just before zero hour, they should be of an extremely noticeable nature, so that a fire cannot be mistaken for them, and they would have to be extinguished very easily. I think that here again experiments might be carried out using flares dropped by other aircraft.
In both remote and low release the glider pilot must do very accurate map reading. It seemed from the experience of my pilots that it is not very easy to map read from a Horsa. I suggest that a perspex panel should be fitted in the floor of the cockpit of a Horsa. This would enable the second pilot of the glider to do the map reading, in the same way as a bomb aimer on a powered aircraft.
Horsa undercarriage
At the moment, the position is that the undercarriage of a Horsa is made to be jettisoned, and in fact it is seldom jettisoned. There always will be a prejudice among glider pilots against landing on the skid. They have very little training on skid landings, as it is a very difficult training programme to run. Secondly, with differential brakes on the glider, they have far better control of the aircraft after landing, I suggest that a new undercarriage for the Horsa should be produced, which has far less drag and need not be jettisoned.
O.T.U. Training of glider and tug pilots
I believe that an attempt is now being made to give tug pilots a proper O.T.U. [Operational Training Unit] training in airborne work, but as far as I know there is no O.T.U. for glider pilots. During his Service training, the glider pilot does no night landing under operational conditions. The glider pilots at the moment get very little flying after they have finished their training. They depend, for the most part, on the three Squadrons, Nos. 295, 296 and 297. These Squadrons have other commitments – parachute dropping, nickel raids, and moon-light bombing raids on France. In consequence, the glider pilots do not get enough flying to keep in practice, let alone to learn operational work. Colonel Chatterton told me that some glider pilots who flew on the operation had only done eight hours flying since 1942. Unless a drastic increase is made in the number of these Towing Squadrons, this position will deteriorate as the number of glider pilots increase.
There is another aspect of the shortage of Squadrons doing airborne work. Not only are they insufficient to keep the glider pilots in training, but they are insufficient to take the Airborne Division into operation. Many of the American tug pilots have been blamed for some of the failures in Sicily, but without their help it would not have been possible to do an airborne invasion, as the R.A.F. have not allotted a sufficient number of aircraft to towing or parachute dropping. Another Airborne Division is now forming.
As, therefore, it is so difficult to get training for the glider pilot in a Squadron, it is absolutely necessary to establish an O.T.U. Curiously enough, in July 1942 Wing Commander May wrote a syllabus for the operational training of glider pilots, including night exercises similar to those used in Sicily.
There has been for some time a Glider Pilot Exercise Unit at Netheravon. At the moment no attempt is made there to give the glider pilots anything more than a refresher course of what they learnt at their Glider Training School. No night flying is done at G.P.E.U. But it might form a nucleus of a Glider Pilot O.T.U. At the moment they have only Hotspurs towed by Master IIs. If Horsas and suitable tugs are not available, it would be better for the glider pilots to do their O.T.U. work on Hotspurs, rather than not to do it at all.
The individual pilots of No. 295 Squadron engaged on the operation put up an extremely fine show under great difficulties. Taking the operation as a whole they suffered considerable casualties. Fifteen crews at one time or another were allotted to ’A’ Flight for this operation. At present there are only four crews, including mine, left who completed the operation. Of the rest, there are two crews, who owing to engine failure did not take part in the operation. The others are missing or dead. Considering these casualties, the morale of the aircrews remained extremely high, but they were conscious that their job was looked upon by the rest of the R.A.F. as a “stooge” job, and although they did their job conscientiously enough, they seemed to have little enthusiasm for it. A glider on their tail was just something which made their flying more difficult, more tiring, and it seemed more dangerous. Most of them had had their leave and days off cancelled for some considerable time before the operation, as there was so much preliminary flying to be done.
Obviously, tug pilots cannot be kept busy on airborne operations, and to use them on other operations is wasteful. But attempts should be made to stimulate the interest of the tug pilots in glider work. I think that this could be done by crewing them up with glider pilots, if possible, at the O.T.U., and making them do a number of exercises with these glider pilots.
I feel, also, that the tug pilots should do some glider flying themselves. Good tug flying is only a matter of flying sympathetically with the glider pilot, and to do that one must understand his problems.
The operations in Sicily showed that it is extremely expensive to have inexperienced tug pilots. A mistake in the point of release by the tug pilot may cost the lives of 32 soldiers.
A version of this article appeared in “Glider Pilot’s Notes”, the magazine of the Glider Pilot Regiment Society.
